T.A.C. meeting LNL 23/1/2014

Workpackage SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION*L. Sarchiapone D. Zafiropoulos D. Benini J. Esposito*

Radiation Protection items

- 1. Spes ^α: work done and existing licensing
	- Shielding
	- Activation (cyclotron-beam line, air, soil, water, concrete)
	- Radioactive release in case of accident
- 2. Spes β: ongoing calculations
	- RIB extraction and transport
	- Activity build up on selected elements
	- –Radioactive gas exhausted
	- Irradiated targets temporary storage
	- Risk analysis
- 3. Spes γ: ongoing calculations

Spes α: licensing - prescriptions

- • Conventional (non fissile) targets, SiC and LaC, can be used with maximum proton current 200 μA in bunker 1
- Graphite and other mediumhigh Z targets can be used with maximum proton current 500 μA in bunker 2
- • UCx target at this stage can be used exclusively to test the transport line to the existing linac, with proton current $\overline{5}$ μA and energy 40 MeV (maximum test period allowed: 18 months)

Spes α: Project constraints

Compliance with the following constraints must be guaranteed:

- 5 μSv/h in controlled areas
- 0.3 μSv/h in areas for non exposed personnel
- 1000 hours/year exposed classified personnel allowed to stay in controlled areas
- 2000 hours/year cyclotron working time

Spes α: existing licensing and shielding

Dose rate constraints are achieved with adequate shielding design. The optimum thickness has been evaluated with numerical simulations, using as source term:

- For the irradiation bunker shielding: UC_{x} target with proton current of 300 μA and energy 70 MeV
- For the cyclotron vault shielding: proton current losses of 5% in acceleration (30-70 MeV) and 0,6% on the magnet bending the beam on target

Spes ^α: layout and shielding results

Spes ^α: activation

 $10¹$

 10^{-4}

EOF

150

200

Depth in concrete [cm]

250

300

 350

 $40₆$

1 year cooling 10 years cooling years coolin 100

 50

T 6,6 10⁶ 4,3 10⁴ 2,0 **0,8** 1,1 10¹³ p on UCx, 40 MeV, 200 μA

 109.34 m $1.4 \cdot 10^4$ $9.6 \cdot 10^3$ 0.4 0.4 $2.6 \cdot 10^{12}$

41Ar

TOT

Spes α: ventilation system

SiC target

•The annual activity released is $5x10^{12}$ Bq

Nuclide $\mathbf{T}_{1/2}$

- • More than 99% of the total activity is due to nuclides with half life lower than 75 days (7 Be, 11 C, 13 N, 15 O, 41 Ar)
- •The concentration is 1 Bq/g at the exhaust and no storage time is needed
- • For nuclides with half life longer than 75 days it is shown that the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) is less than $1 \mu Sv/y$

 12.33 y 1.1 10^8

 $87.51 \text{ d} \qquad 6.8 \, 10^6$

Spes α: ventilation system <u>UC_x target</u>

- More than 99% of the total activity is due to nuclides with half life lower than 75 days (⁷Be, ¹¹C, ¹³N, ¹⁵O, ⁴¹Ar)
- For H⁺ at 40 MeV and 200 μ A, a decay time of 20 min is long enough to keep the concentration lower than 1 Bq/g (less than 2 hours for 70 MeV and 300 μ A, annual activity released 7 x 10¹⁴ Bq)
- In the worst irradiation case, for nuclides with half life longer than 75 days it is shown that the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) is less than 10 μSv/y, thus is definitely not relevant from a radiological point of view.

\star Spes α : Radioactive release in case of accident

Protons on SiC, 70 MeV, 200 μA

Protons on C, 70 MeV, 500 μA

1 mSv/y and 10 μSv/y are obtained for distances greater than 300 m ad 3 km from the point of emission

1 mSv/y and 10 μSv/y are obtained for distances significantly minor than in the case of SiC

Spes β: RIB extraction and transport

- The beam of interest for physics will be extracted from the target and transported to the re-accelerating Linac
- Depending on the performances of various elements (ionization sources, Wien filter ...) the beam is not «pure», but it comes out together with other beams of the same mass number
- Interaction of those beams with the elements of the transport line might lead to a stack of radioactive ions, behaving like radioactive sources
- Ambient dose equivalent rates in presence of those sources, and radioactivity build up, are relevant quantities from a RP point of view.

Spes β: RIB extraction and transport

HRMS

The beam of physical
interest is **Sn-132**. When
extracted with a Laser Ion
Source, it comes out with
just one contaminant beam,
Cs-132

cm

 10^{-5}

 10^{3}

 $10²$

 10^{1}

 10^0

 10^{-1}

 10^{-2}

 10^{-3}

 10^{-4}

The deposition of the beam on the element causes a problem in case personnel intervention is needed in vicinity of the Charge Breeder.

10 days after the end of the beam extraction the total dose rate $(Sn+Cs)$ is in the order of 10 μSv/h at few meters from the element.

The beam of physical interest is **I-135**. When extracted with a Plasma Ion Source, it comes out with many contaminant beams (listed in table)

$$
\overset{\text{135}}{\underset{\text{135}}{\text{Ba}}} \overset{\text{1.7s}}{\xrightarrow{\beta}} \overset{\text{135}}{\longrightarrow} \text{Te} \overset{\text{18.6s}}{\xrightarrow{\beta^{\cdot}}} \overset{\text{135}}{\xrightarrow{\beta^{\cdot}}} \overset{\text{6.6h}}{\xrightarrow{\beta^{\cdot}}} \overset{\text{135}}{\underset{\beta^{\cdot}}{\text{Me}}} \overset{\text{9.1h}}{\xrightarrow{\beta^{\cdot}}} \overset{\text{135}}{\xrightarrow{\beta^{\cdot}}} \text{Ca} \overset{\text{2.10^6y}}{\xrightarrow{\beta^{\cdot}}} \overset{\text{135}}{\xrightarrow{\beta^{\cdot}}} \text{Ca} \overset{\text{2.10^6y}}{\xrightarrow{\beta^{\cdot}}} \overset{\text{2.10^6y}}{\xrightarrow{\beta^{\cdot}}} \overset{\text{2.10^6y}}{\xrightarrow{\beta^{\cdot}}} \text{Ca} \overset
$$

$$
\xrightarrow{\text{135}} \text{Pr} \xrightarrow{\text{23.3m} \text{ 135}} \text{Ce} \xrightarrow{\text{17.7h} \text{ 135}} \text{La} \xrightarrow{\text{19.5h} \text{ 135}} \text{Ba}
$$

The beam of physical interest is **I-135**. When extracted with a Plasma Ion Source, it comes out with many contaminant beams (listed in table)

In case each of these beams hits an element of the transport line it generates a radioactive ion source of about 3 Ci (the number can be scaled to the amount of current interacting), due to Cs-135 ($T_{1/2}$ = millions of years)

\n $\text{135Sb} \xrightarrow{\text{1.7s}} \text{135Te} \xrightarrow{\text{18.6s}} \text{135I} \xrightarrow{\text{6.6h}} \text{135Xe} \xrightarrow{\text{9.1h}} \text{135Cs} \xrightarrow{\text{2106y}} \text{135Ba}$ \n
\n $\text{135Pr} \xrightarrow{\text{23.3m}} \text{135Ce} \xrightarrow{\text{17.7h}} \text{135La} \xrightarrow{\text{19.5h}} \text{135Ba}$ \n

Te 135 \triangle I 135 \times Xe 135 \triangle Cs 135 \odot TOTALE

Spes β: radioactive gas exhausted

- • Calculations show that if the gaseous radioactive species would be stocked all together immediately after an UCx irradiation cycle (2 weeks), the dose rate outside of the tank would be as high as 200 mSv/h
- \bullet After 1 day there would be less than 10 mSv/h, and after 10 days around 1 mSv/h

- The UCx target is irradiated for two weeks with a proton beam of 40 MeV energy and 200 uA current
- After few days the target is removed from the front end and placed in a lead-steel box. It is then moved close to the bunker, in a temporary storage place.
- The lead-steel box is 4 cm thick: 1 cm Steel $+ 2,5 \text{ cm}$ Pb $+ 0,5$ **cm** Steel
- When a second irradiated target has to be stored, the first one is moved forward, so that it will partially shield the fresh one (and so on for further targets)

If unshielded, at the end of the storagecorridor there would be 300 $\mu\mathrm{Sv}/\mathrm{h}.$

A concrete wall of **70 cm** at least is necessary to achieve an attenuation of 10^{-3} for the dose rate (photons of nearly 3 MeV).

Risk analysis – International references **Home Of the Street**

 \bullet ICRP 76: *Protection from Potential Exposure : Application to Selected Radiation Sources*

Risk analysis for answering if a potential exposure to radiation could be acceptable or not.

- Principle: *defence in depth*
- 1) Design aimed to minimize the risk
- 2) Risk reduction using safety devices (interlocks)
- 3) Alarm devices (radiation alarms)
- 4) Procedures and training of personnel
- 5) Residual risk identification at the stage of reviewing the facility

Redudance and diversification

Risk analysis examples **1**

Entrance in the cyclotron area when cyclotron is operating: Fault Tree Analysis

Risk analysis examples **2**

Entrance in the bunker area when the beam is on target: Fault Tree Analysis

Risk analysis examples **3**

Entrance in the RIB'S area when the beam running: Event Tree Analysis)

Total 0.7 times/year could happen an entrance in an area with radiation risk

Spes γ: source term

- • Among the target nuclides proposed for the production of radiopharmaceuticals, ⁸⁵Rb is the crucial one for the determination of the shielding thickness and the RP measures.
- •Through a **(p,4n)** reaction, ⁸⁵Rb leads to $82Sr$, that decays into $82Rb$ of medical interest
- •With proton energy in the range 40-70 MeV σ s of the reactions are between tens and hundreds of mb \rightarrow high neutron fluxes

 $85Rb(p,3n)83Sr$ $85Rb(p,4n)^{82}Sr$ ${}^{85}Rb(p,5n){}^{81}Sr$

• Shielding have been designed considering a maximum current of 1 mA

Spes γ: shielding

Involved in:

- Defining the Radiological Safety System for SPES- α
- Completing the SPES-β phase (evaluation of the various experimental areas, improvement of the exhausted system, accident related to the UCx source) and produce the Technical Report for licensing
- Completing the SPES-γ phase (shielding completion, target transport system, activation of the air and surroundings, maximum accident predictable, laboratory areas)