

Chip Irradiation per I 'Industria

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- An Abrupt Introduction to Radiation Effects: the Qantas Flight 72 Incident
- Radiation Environments
 - Terrestrial, Artificial
- Radiation Effects in Electronic Devices
 - Single Event Effects (SEE)
- Industrial Concern over SEE
- SEE Testing
- Conclusions



Qantas Flight 72

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Qantas Flight 72 (QF72) was a scheduled flight from Singapore [...] to Perth [...] on 7 October 2008 that made an emergency landing [...] following an inflight accident featuring a pair of sudden <u>uncommanded pitch-down</u> <u>manoeuvres</u> that resulted in serious injuries to many of the occupants




From Wikipedia



Qantas Flight 72 (2)

"There was a limitation in the algorithm used by the A330/ A340 [...] for processing angle of attack (AOA) data. This limitation meant that, in a very specific situation, **multiple** AOA **spikes from only one** of the three air data inertial **reference** units **could result in a nose-down** elevator command."



From ATSB TRANSPORT SAFETY REPORT Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2008-070 "In-flight upset 154 km west of Learmonth, WA 7 October 2008VH-QPA Airbus A330-303"




"One of the aircraft's three air data inertial reference units (ADIRU 1) exhibited a **data-spike failure mode**, during which it transmitted a significant amount of incorrect data on air data parameters to other aircraft systems, without flagging that this data was invalid."

"The LTN-101 air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU) model had a demonstrated susceptibility to <u>single event</u> <u>effects</u> (SEE). "

From ATSB TRANSPORT SAFETY REPORT Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2008-070 "In-flight upset 154 km west of Learmonth, WA 7 October 2008VH-QPA Airbus A330-303"



The Space Radiation Environment



Artistic render courtesy of NASA


Space was the first community that had to deal with radiation effects on electronics (Telstar incident)

Electronics onboard satellites must cope with:

- TrappedParticles
- Solar Particle Events
- Galactic Cosmic Rays



Terrestrial Environment: Sea Level



Issues at sea level:

- Alpha-emitting radioactive contaminants in dice and packages
- Recently concern on muon-induced soft errors has surfaced
- The biggest threat: atmospheric neutrons


(high-energy and thermal). Actually, the whole energy spectrum is capable of generating effects in electronic chips

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Terrestrial Environment: Avionics



Avionics

Neutron flux is ~
300x at
commercial
airplane altitudes,
compared to sea
level

 Airplanes have many critical systems

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Artificial sources of radiation

- Radiation therapy and diagnostic facilities
- Industrial accelerators and sources
- Nuclear power plants
- High-energy physics experiments



Who's affected?

- All makers of systems needing <u>high-reliability</u>
- > Aerospace
 - Satellites
 - Civilian and military aircrafts
- Medical
 - Implanted electronic devices (pacemakers, defibrillators...)
 - Nuclear Industry
 - Instrumentation and control in proximity to reactors
 - Transport
 - Electronics in cars and trains
 - Signalling and traffic control networks
 - IT Networks and





Total Ionizing Dose

- affects dielectric layers (e.g., gate, isolation, and passivation oxides)
- causes parametric shifts in transistors/device parameters
- cumulative effect, usually reported as a function of ionizing dose

Displacement Damage

- affects bulk materials (e.g. crystalline Silicon)
- cumulative effect, usually reported as a function of equivalent neutron fluence or displacement dose

Single Event Effects


- stochastic effects: caused by a single ionizing particle impinging randomly on a sensitive device volume
- cause a variety of different effects: memory corruption, burn-out, etc.

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
- Single Event Effect (SEE): perturbation of the behavior of electronic (optoelectronic) devices, circuits and/or systems produced by a single ionizing particle
- Non-destructive (soft errors):
 - Single Event Upset (SEU)
 - Single Bit Upset (SBU)
 - Multiple Bit Upset (MBU)
 - Single Event Transient (SET)
 - Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI)
 - Single Event Latchup (SEL)... may be destructive
- > **Destructive (hard errors)**:
 - Single Event Burnout (SEB)
 - Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR)
 - Stuck Bits




Destructive event in a COTS 120V DC-DC Converter

> K. LaBel, EWRHE 2004


















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
 $\bigcap_{i=1}^{n}$












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
Neutron-induced Single Event Effects



n-induced SEEs are due to secondary ionizing particles, generated by the interaction of n with the chip materials



Neutron Energy




n-induced SEEs occur when the energy of the impinging neutron is above a minimum threshold value





Thermal Neutrons




"Soft errors have become a huge concern in advanced computer chips because, uncorrected, they produce a failure rate that is higher than all the other reliability mechanisms combined!"

R. Baumann, Fellow, IEEE (was with Texas Instruments)

"Since chip SER is viewed by many as a **legal liability** (selling something that you know may fail), the public literature in this field is sparse and always makes management nervous" *J. Ziegler and H. Puchner, "SER-History, Trends and Challenges", Cypress Semiconductors, 2004*



Industrial Concern over Soft Errors (2)





- "Timely testing avoids cosmic ray damage to critical auto electronics", John Wood and Earl Caustin, MOSAID Systems, 15/6/2006
- "Cosmic rays damage automotive electronics", Martin Mason, Actel Corporation, 31/5/2006
- "Alpine lab enters rarified air of soft-error test", Junko Yoshida, 25/9/2006
- "SEU mitigation in Stratix III Devices", May 2007



AUTOMOTIVE Design Line





Why Testing?

- Semiconductor companies make soft error tests at the component level, but results are confidential (arbitrary units are typically used in publications) and disclosed only to very large customers
- System-level error rates are difficult to derive from component data or may be too overestimated
- Failure rates can be as high as 10⁵ FIT

For terrestrial applications, a **neutron source** reproducing the terrestrial spectrum, with some orders of magnitude of acceleration is desirable to test components and systems



Single Event Effects Test Facilities in Padova



SIRAD line at the TANDEM accelerator of the Legnaro Labs

- Heavy ions and protons
- Ion Electron Emission Microscope : unique SEE micro-mapping capability!
- Plans for a SEE neutron facility
 - Uses the new high-current, variable-energy 70-MeV Cyclotron
 - Three different targets under consideration



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Radiation effects are a very serious threat for high-reliability applications, even at sea level, mainly due to atmospheric neutrons

Sensitivity of chips is increasing with each generation, due to feature size scaling

Component- and system-level radiation testing is necessary to avoid issues, such as those occurring in the Qantas 72 flight